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Abstract
The paper solves analytically a problem where individuals sort themselves into neighbor-
hoods because they value average schooling among adults in the neighborhood. The paper
extends results by Nesheim (2002) but with the addition of income e®ects on neighbor-
hood choice. Individuals value housing, non-housing consumption, and expected schooling
of their children. The latter depends on parental schooling, on a child's ability, and on
average schooling in the neighborhood. Neighborhood choice trades o® non-housing con-
sumption with children's expected schooling. Individuals choose neighborhoods recognizing
that their neighbors' characteristics are correlated with their own. The equilibrium housing
price is associated with endogenous sorting and also allows computation of neighborhood
distributions of income, of schooling and other variables of interest.
* The results of this paper were reported originally in my \Neighborhood E®ects and Housing," version
March 3, 2008, Handbook of Social Economics, Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Matthew O. Jackson, eds.,
Elsevier, forthcoming. I thank Bryan Graham for sharing with me his \On the Identi¯cation of Neighborhood
Externalities in the Presence of Endogenous Neighborhood Selection," June 26, 2008. The usual caveats
apply. IoannidesSolutionSorting-August-17-08.texContents
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The paper solves analytically a sorting problem, as originally formulated by Nesheim (2002)
but modi¯ed to also allow for income e®ects in neighborhood choice. Individuals value hous-
ing and expected schooling of their children. The latter depends on parent's schooling, on a
child's ability, and on average parental schooling in the neighborhood. Neighborhood choice
trades o® housing with advantageous contextual e®ects in the production of schooling. In-
dividuals choose neighborhoods while recognizing that their neighbors' characteristics are
correlated with their own. The equilibrium housing price function that we obtain is asso-
ciated with endogenous sorting and also allow us to compute neighborhood distributions of
income and of schooling.
The paper succeeds in going beyond Nesheim's analytical results without resorting to
numerical simulation by slightly varying one of his assumptions. This in a sense \breaks"
the symmetry of his assumptions but we regard doing so as inessential in view of the purpose
of the paper and the clarity of the analytical results.
Endogenous sorting is at the heart of a number of problems that have attracted con-
siderable interest recently. For one, self-selection into neighborhoods is considered as an
obstacle to econometric identi¯cation of neighborhood e®ects. Since neighborhood e®ects
emanate from characteristics of neighborhoods that have been themselves objects of choice,
their characteristics are not independent of characteristics of those who have chosen to re-
side in them. In the canonical Manski (1993) framework, where individuals are subject
to contextual e®ects, such as the characteristics of neighborhoods and their residents, and
to endogenous social e®ects, such as decisions by their neighbors, dependence of between
individuals' characteristics and those of their neighborhoods add a layer of complication
to econometric identi¯cation. That is, individual decisions re°ect at equilibrium the deci-
sions of all other members of the community. A number of works on social interactions,
including mainly theoretical works as Brock and Durlauf (2001), Durlauf (2004), Glaeser
and Scheinkman (2001) and Mo±tt (2001), have sought to obtain conditions under which
endogenous e®ects may be separated from contextual social e®ects. These ideas also apply
2when the concept of the neighborhood is broadly construed to also include social groups,
local communities, and political jurisdictions like cities and metropolitan areas. Individuals'
equilibrium sorting into communities has of course been recognized by this literature. In
fact, such early contributions as Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992) recognize the di±culty of
econometric identi¯cation of local community-level e®ects and propose instrumental variable
techniques to address it. More recently, Epple and Platt (1998) and Epple and Sieg (1999)
address directly properties of equilibrium sorting into communities. Ioannides and Zabel
(2008) and Ioannides and Zanella (2008) seek to identify endogenous neighborhood e®ects
via individuals' choice of residential neighborhoods.
Nesheim (2002) embeds the problem in the explicit hedonic setting of Ekeland, Heckman
and Nesheim (2004), who seek to clarify general conditions under which one may recover
preferences and production relationships from \hedonic market" data. These are markets
where goods with multiple attributes are valued. Examples abound and include workers
with di®erent skills, automobiles with di®erent features, and houses that di®er in terms of
structural characteristics and attributes of the neighborhoods in which they lie. The Nesheim
and Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim solutions in their greatest generality are not amenable
to explicit analytical solutions. In fact, the problem typically involves integration of a general
partial di®erential equation that is rarely possible to do in closed-form.
In the remainder of this paper we ¯x ideas by presenting ¯rst Nesheim's formulation of a
general endogenous sorting with contextual e®ects and income e®ects and his solution of its
special case when income e®ects are excluded. Then we present our solution of his general
model, with contextual e®ects as well as own income e®ects actually present.
2 Nesheim's Model of Sorting
In Nesheim (2002) individuals choose their location from among a continuum of locations
that di®er in terms of an attribute that individuals value, average neighborhood schooling
among the adults. Individuals consume a unit of housing each and have preferences over
non-housing and their own child's expected schooling. That is, an individual (household)
3allocates her income over non-housing consumption, I¡R(`); where I;R(`); are, respectively,
income and unit housing rent at location `; ` 2 R+:
Following Nesheim, we describe households in terms of a vector of attributes, z =
(z1;z2;z3;z4;z5); whose components are de¯ned respectively as: log of parental schooling,
s0 = ez1; log of parental income, I = ez2; log of the child's ability in school, a = ez3; log
of a preference parameter that weights a child's schooling outcome, ¯ = ez4; and a random
shock to schooling outcome, z5; which will be assumed to be uncorrelated with all other
components:
z = (`ns0;`nI;`na;`n¯;z5):
Households maximize utility by choosing location, `: Utility is additively separable in
non-housing consumption, I ¡ R(`); and in expected schooling for the child, conditional on















Schooling production in location ` is de¯ned via an educational production function as a
function of: average schooling in `; S(`); own parent's schooling, ez1; the child's ability, ez3;




where ´1;´2; are positive parameters. The random shock z5 is the only quantity that is unob-
servable by the household when it chooses location and is independent of location. Average
schooling at each location, S(`); and the housing rent, R(`); are both endogenous. They
must be determined consistently with equilibrium sorting of households across locations.
The sorting equilibrium is de¯ned in terms of: one, a mapping F(z) that assigns household
types to locations, z 2 Z; F(z) : Z ! R+; and two, a housing price function R(`) that
equilibrates the housing market in all locations ` 2 R+: In other words, S(`) is endogenous,
being de¯ned as the average schooling of parents who have chosen to locate in neighborhood
`; S(`); S(`) = E [ez1jz 2 F ¡1(`)]:
4Individuals take the sorting equilibrium as given. The analytics are simpli¯ed because
conditional on an individual's characteristics, location in the utility maximization problem
may be represented via average schooling of parents in each neighborhood, S(`): Therefore,
under the assumption of monotonicity (which needs to be satis¯ed at equilibrium), the choice
of location is equivalently handled via the choice of S: Consequently, the price function is
equivalently de¯ned as a function of the contextual e®ect, S, p(S); that is instead of price
of location, R(`):
The special case of ° = 0 renders the ¯rst term in the utility function (1) linear in












The utility maximization problem is simpli¯ed enormously, but the impact of income on
neighborhood choice is excluded. The ¯rst-order condition involves the equilibrium price




´2z1+z3+z4 = 0: (4)
Viewed alternatively, this condition designates a set of characteristics of individuals who
choose expected neighborhood schooling S; given price p(S): Clearly, it implies tradeo®s
among such individuals' own schooling, their child's ability and the relative weight they
assign to schooling. Rearranging (4) and taking logs yields:
´2z1 + z3 + z4 = `n[pS(S)] ¡ `n[A0´1] + (1 ¡ ´1)`nS; (5)
where A0 = E(ez5): If z5 » N(0;¾2




RHS above is the marginal e®ect of average neighborhood schooling, neighborhood quality,
measured in terms of S, and price on utility; the LHS is the marginal willingness to pay for
neighborhood quality.
Average neighborhood schooling, that is, average schooling of parents who choose location
S; may now be de¯ned in terms of condition (5):
S = E fe
z1j´2z1 + z3 + z4 = `npS(S) ¡ `n(A0´1) + (1 ¡ ´1)`nSg: (6)
5Once an unconditional multivariate normal distribution is assumed for the vector z, then it
is elementary to derive an expression for the right hand side of (6) [Nesheim (2002), p. 21],
the average schooling of individuals who choose location S, conditional on (5). The can be
rewritten as a di®erential equation in p(S):
2.1 Endogenous Contextual E®ects and Hedonic Prices
Let £(S) denotes the one-dimensional index of neighborhood quality, the RHS of (5):
£(S) ´ `n[pS(S)] ¡ `n[A0´1] + (1 ¡ ´1)`nS;
and let ÁT = (´2;0;1;1;0): Then ÁTz; the LHS of (5), denotes an one-dimensional index of
consumer willingness to pay for educational quality. If z » N(¹;§); then the log education





» N (e ¹1; e ¾1);
with mean and variance, according to standard theory, given by






















1 = (1;0;0;0;0); denotes the square of the correlation coe±cient
between log education of parents and willingness to pay for neighborhood quality. Clearly,
due to sorting, the variance of the log education of parents, conditional on the willingness
to pay for neighborhood quality is less than in the entire population.
Using the expression for the expectation of ez1; conditional on the willingness to pay for
neighborhood quality being equal to location quality, we have S = E fez1jÁTz = £(S)g =
ee ¹1+ 1
2e ¾2





where the auxiliary variables L0;L1 are functions of behavioral parameters and of the pa-








6Note that L1 is the covariance between willingness to pay for neighborhood quality and log
education of parents.
Integrating di®erential equation Equ. (7) and using the assumption that locations with













This is the equilibrium price function, the hedonic price of housing, as a function of average
neighborhood education of parents, the contextual e®ect.
The interpretation of this solution is interesting. The elasticity of the hedonic price with
respect to neighborhood quality is equal to the elasticity of schooling with respect to quality,
´1; plus the inverse of the covariance between willingness to pay for neighborhood quality
and log education of parents, 1
L1: The larger is ´1; the larger percentage price di®erentials
must be to segregate individuals into their preferred locations. The larger the covariance
between willingness to pay for neighborhood quality and parental education, the less parents
are willing to pay directly for neighborhood quality, since they contribute indirectly through
their own education and therefore the smaller the price di®erentials are required to be to
maintain segregation of households at equilibrium. The equilibrium price function (8) is
convex (concave), if ´1+ 1
L1 > (<)1: However, for the solution to be meaningful, ´1+ 1
L1 > 0:
This theory yields three speci¯c testable implications. First is the educational production
function along the lines of (2), a relationship between schooling outcomes, observable inputs
in neighborhoods, including contextual e®ects and unobservable individual and family char-
acteristics. This is typically postulated in the social interactions literature and is testable,
in principle. Second is the ¯rst-order condition for the optimal location, (4), which is the
hedonic demand equation, an individual's marginal valuation of location, de¯ned in terms of
average schooling of parents, as a function of individual characteristics. And third, the actual
equilibrium housing price function, (8). These three relationships depend on the same set of
deep parameters, namely the parameters of the utility and educational production functions
and of the joint distribution function of parental schooling, of parental income, of child's abil-
ity in school, log of a preference parameter that enters a child's schooling outcome, relative
7valuation of child's schooling, and a stochastic shock to schooling outcome. Furthermore,
the distributions of education and of income of parents who choose neighborhood education
S are quite straightforward to derive.
The index of neighborhood quality depends on S only: £(S) ´ ¡ 1
L1`nL0 ¡ `n(A0´1) +
1











Note that the log of average neighborhood schooling chosen is linear in L1(´2z1 + z3 + z4);
where the e®ect of individual characteristics is moderated by L1: However, the larger the
covariance L1 between willingness to pay for neighborhood quality and parental education,
the greater the elasticity of neighborhood education with respect to parental schooling.
That is, the larger is L1; the more neighborhood quality parents are willing to purchase
directly, since this makes their own education more e®ective in ensuring greater segregation
of households at equilibrium. We see below that this result is modi¯ed substantially in the
presence of income e®ects.
Also interesting is the relationship between the log of a child's education and household
characteristics. That is:
`ns1 = a0 + ´2(1 + ´1L1)z1 + (1 + ´1L1)z3 + ´1L1z4 + z5; (9)
where a0 is a function of parameters. If covariance L1 and/or ´1 is very large, it is possible
that the log of children's education increase more than proportionately with that of their
parents.
The hedonic price literature typically estimates an arbitrary functional form for the re-
lationship between the (marginal) valuation for neighborhood amenities as a function of
observables and unobservables. However, it is a key implication of Nesheim's theory that
individual utility maximization exactly determines the equilibrium price, as a function of
contextual characteristics,and this in turn determines sorting. A typical estimation ap-
proach would be to estimate a system of equations for individual education outcomes and
average parental education by neighborhood. As Nesheim (2002) shows in detail, this model
8is not entirely identi¯ed, although groups of parameters may be identi¯ed by means of data
on observable educational outcomes as function of parental education, neighborhood school
quality, and income.
3 The Case of Income E®ects
Nesheim (2002) claims that when ° 6= 0; the counterpart of the di®erential equation (7),
that the hedonic price function must satisfy, does not lend itself to an analytical solution
and may only be solved numerically.1
We modify the underlying assumptions of Nesheim (2002) by assuming that component
z2 of the vector of individual characteristics z is the level of parental income, not its log.
This modi¯cation does break the symmetry of Nesheim's setting but pays o® nicely in terms





´2z1+z3+z4 = 0: (10)
Rearranging and taking logs yields the counterpart of (5):
´2z1 + °z2 + z3 + z4 = £(S); (11)
where:
£(S) ´ °p(S) + `n[pS(S)] ¡ `n(A0´1) + (1 ¡ ´1)`nS: (12)
This more general formulation di®ers because the willingness to pay includes an e®ect of
parental income, °z2; and the neighborhood quality index £(S) includes the term °p(S):
De¯ning the vector of parameters ' now as
'
T = (´2;°;1;1;0) (13)
and using it in place of Á in the derivations and formulas, we now have instead of (7) the
di®erential equation:




1Interestingly, Nesheim also shows that this more general model is econometrically fully identi¯ed.
























We see the properties of this more general result for the price function by di®erentiating
(15). The equilibrium price function is increasing in S: Its curvature is determined by the




































Therefore, the equilibrium price function is convex for low values of S and up to the threshold
point, concave thereafter, and provided that ´1 + 1
L1 > 1; ° > 0: Here we see that a
key property of social interactions models is rea±rmed, if this condition is satis¯ed: the
equilibrium price is a sigmoid function of average neighborhood quality. In view of the
de¯nition of L1 above, the covariance between willingness to pay for neighborhood quality




´2¾11 + °¾21 + ¾31 + ¾41
> 1:
As expected, the parameters describing the distribution of income also enter the equi-
librium price function. Both solutions (7) and (14) underscore an important property of
hedonic price theory. While an individual's marginal valuation of neighborhood quality, the
hedonic demand equation (11), now does depend on the individual's income, the equilibrium
price function (14) depend, via the functions L0;L1; only on the statistics of the income dis-
tribution and its joint distribution with the other characteristics of interest. Furthermore,
the theory allows us to relate the statistics of income distribution, conditional on average
neighborhood schooling, to its equilibrium price.
How does our solution with income e®ects compare with that of Neisheim's? First, we
note that for small S; (15) implies (8). Second, for large S; the second term within the





















In this case, the elasticity of equilibrium price with respect to neighborhood quality is in-
creasing in ´1L1 and decreasing in the coe±cient of absolute risk aversion ° with respect
to non-housing consumption. In contrast, this elasticity in the absence of income e®ects,
´1 + 1
L1; is quite di®erent and re°ects an additional parameter, °:
The optimal value of average neighborhood schooling for an individual with characteris-




















L1 = ~ A0e
´2z1+°z2+z3+z4;
where ~ A0 ´ A0´1L
1
L1
0 : The choice of neighborhood for an individual with characteristics
(z1;z2;z3;z4) is implicitly determined from the above equation. Given a solution for S; S =
S(z1;z2;z3;z4); then the child's education follows from (2), `s1 = ´2z1 + z3 + z5 + ´1S: The
dependence of a child's education on parental income is brought in via S:
If L1 > 1; the covariance between the willingness to pay for neighborhood education
quality and the income of parents, is greater than 1, then the LHS of the above equation
is increasing monotonically in S, and therefore there exists a unique solution for any given
value of the willingness to pay neighborhood for education quality ´2z1 + °z2 + z3 + z4;
with respect to which it would be increasing. In particular, individuals with larger incomes
choose higher average neighborhood quality. And holding neighborhood quality constant,
incomes are negatively correlated with individuals' own education and with their children's
schooling ability [ c.f. Epple and Platt (1998)]. Individuals with more own schooling choose
neighborhoods with higher average schooling, which in turn implies higher schooling for their
children.
The magnitude of L1 does a®ect the sensitivity of S with respect to the willingness to
pay neighborhood for education quality. If L1 < 1 and ´1+ 1
L1 < 1; then there will, in general
and subject to feasibility conditions, exist two solutions. For only one of them, the smaller in
magnitude, it would be the case that neighborhood education increases with willingness to
11pay for it and with income, in particular. This is also the case if ´1+ 1
L1 > 1; and provided the
value is not too large. Both solutions are in principle acceptable. They have with di®erent
properties. For example, the higher value implies that individuals with more own schooling
choose neighborhoods with lower average schooling, which in turn implies lower schooling
for their children. In other words, depending upon parameter values, the model allows for
schooling to be either a normal or an inferior good.
Another way to see the consequences of this approach is to consider the distribution of
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with mean and variance
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¾22('T§'); denotes the square of the correlation coe±cient between log education
of parents and willingness to pay for neighborhood quality, and the solution (15) is used in
the expression for £(S); in (12). In this case, function £(S) becomes:
£(S) ´ ¡`n( ~ A0) +
1
L1



















A su±cient condition for the mean income of parents who choose S to increase with S is
L1 ¡ 1 > 0: Similarly, the conditional distribution of education of parents who choose has a
tractable dependence on their own education.
4 Relationship to Previous Literature
The paper aims at contributing to a recent literature on the in°uence on schooling outcomes
for children from the educational attainment of their adult neighbors. Such neighborhood
e®ects on schooling have been posited as stylized facts and addressed by typically atheoret-
ical papers, such as Brooks{Gunn et al. (1993), who emphasize the importance of sorting
bias, and Kremer (1997), who estimates schooling as a function of parental schooling and
12neighborhood schooling and assesses the implied role of sorting in inequality. Ioannides
(2003) shows empirically that non-linearities in the general relationship, whose special case
is estimated by Kremer (1997), may alter his key results.
The present paper is most closely related to Nesheim (2002), whose pioneering contribu-
tion emphasizes the role of housing price in residential sorting and derives theoretically the
properties of associated hedonic housing functions. Unfortunately, Nesheim's most general
model may not be solved analytically, and the model that is actually solved does not allow
for income e®ects in neighborhood choice. This a®ects critically the functional form of the
hedonic price.
Graham (2008)2 emphasizes the econometric identi¯cation of neighborhood exernalities
in a model where schooling is a function of parental and neighborhood schooling, and where
adult income is a function of own schooling. Human capital acquisition ability and labor
market ability may co-vary. Graham assumes that the total ability e®ect is jointly distributed
with parental human capital and seeks to identify the causal e®ects of parental schooling and
neighborhood schooling, while recognizing that parents choose the neighborhoods where they
bring up their children. In his behavioral model, parents care for own consumption and for
expected consumption by their children, may borrow, and purchase housing. Housing \buys"
access to neighborhood amenities, and its hedonic price is thus a function of neighborhood
quality. Intertemporal optimization yields an Euler-like equation, which links the hedonic
price of housing to parental schooling, neighborhood schooling and total ability. Graham's
equation is the counterpart of Equ. (12) above. Its integration yields a hedonic price as an
isoelastic function of neighborhood schooling. This is the exact counterpart of Nesheim's
analytic solution, reproduced here as Equ. (8), and is thus clearly less general than our
derivation of the hedonic price function (15) from a model that also allows for income e®ects
on individuals' location decisions.
2Graham and I were unaware of each other's work. When he generously shared with me his Graham
(2008) working paper, I reciprocated by sharing with him the March 3, 2008 version of Ioannides (2008).
135 Conclusions
This paper extends results by Nesheim (2002) in an important direction by allowing for
income e®ects in neighborhood choice. Since individuals value neighborhood schooling as an
input to schooling attained by their children, they self-select into neighborhoods. That is,
parents' choice of neighborhood and therefore of their children's education is in°uenced by
their own income. Therefore, assessing the impact of neighborhood schooling on children's
schooling requires accounting for sorting bias.
For an individual's child, schooling outcome is assumed to be a function of average
parental schooling in the neighborhood, own schooling, own income, the child's ability, the
weight of schooling in her preferences and a random factor. Individuals' utility maximizing
choices imply a hedonic price of housing which mediates sorting of individuals into neigh-
borhoods at equilibrium. The resulting average parental schooling in neighborhoods, the
single quality attribute of each neighborhood in the model, is consistent with individuals'
decisions.
We may use the model to study the dynamics of the co-evolution of individual and
neighborhood schooling. The fact that neighborhood choice is a®ected by income has rich
implications. The intertemporal evolution of schooling may be non-linear. Linking income
with adult schooling would allow us to study the e®ect on the intertemporal evolution of the
income distribution of neighborhood schooling as an input to the production of schooling.
146 References
Brock, William A. and Steven N. Durlauf. 2001. \Interactions-based Models." Handbook of
Econometrics 5: 3297 - 3380, James Heckman and Edward Leamer, Eds. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Brooks-Gunn, Jeanne, Greg J. Duncan, Pamela Kato Klebanov and Naomi Sealand. (1993).
\Do Neighborhoods In°uence Child and Adolescent Development?" American Journal
of Sociology 99 (2):353 { 395.
Durlauf, Steven N. 2004. \Neighborhood E®ects." Handbook of Regional and Urban Eco-
nomics 4: 2173 - 2242, J.Vernon Henderson and Jacques-Francois Thisse, Eds. Ams-
terdam: North- Holland.
Ekeland, Ivar, James J. Heckman, and Lars Nesheim. 2004. \Identi¯cation and Estimation
of Hedonic Models." Journal of Political Economy 112 (S1): S60 - S109.
Epple, Dennis and Glen J. Platt. 1998. \Equilibrium and Local Redistribution in an Urban
Economy when Households Di®er in both Preferences and Incomes." Journal of Urban
Economics 43 (1): 23 { 51.
Epple, Dennis and Holger Sieg. 1999. \Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdic-
tions." Journal of Political Economy 107 (4): 645 { 681.
Evans, William N., Wallace E. Oates, and Robert M. Schwab. 1992. \Measuring Peer
Group E®ects: a Study of Teenage Behavior." Journal of Political Economy 100(5):
966 { 991.
Glaeser, Edward L., and Jos¶ e A. Scheinkman. 2001. \Measuring Social Interactions." in
Social Dynamics: 83 { 130, Steven N. Durlauf and Peyton Young, Eds. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Graham, Bryan S. 2008. \On the Identi¯cation of Neighborhood Externalities in the Pres-
ence of Endogenous Neighborhood Selection." Department of Economics, University
of California, Berkeley, June 26.
15Ioannides, Yannis M. 2003. \Empirical Nonlinearities and Neighborhood E®ects in the
Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital." Applied Economics Letters, 10,
535{539.
Ioannides, Yannis M. 2008. `Neighborhood E®ects and Housing." written for Handbook
of Social Economics, Jess Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Matthew O. Jackson, eds.,
Elsevier, forthcoming, version March 3.
Ioannides, Yannis M. and Je®rey E. Zabel. 2008. \Interactions, Neighborhood Selection
and Housing Demand." Journal of Urban Economics 63(1): 229 { 252.
Ioannides, Yannis M. and Giulio Zanella. 2008. \Searching for the Best Neighborhood:
Mobility and Social Interactions." working paper, Department of Economics, Tufts
University, April.
Kremer, Michael. 1997. \How Much Does Sorting Increase Inequality?" Quarterly Journal
of Economics 112(1): 115 { 139.
Manski, Charles F. 1993. \Identi¯cation of Endogenous Social E®ects: the Re°ection
Problem." Review of Economic Studies 60 (3): 531 - 542.
Mo±tt, Robert A. 2001. \Policy Interventions, Low-level Equilibria and Social Interac-
tions." in Social Dynamics: 45 - 82 Steven N. Durlauf and H. Peyton Young, Eds.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Nesheim, Lars. 2002. \Equilibrium Sorting of Heterogeneous Consumers across Locations:
Theory and Empirical Implications." CEMMAP Working Paper CWP08/02, Univer-
sity College London.
16